Normal science as put forward by Thomas Kuhn relates to the problem solving work that goes on within a paradigm. This stands in contrast with the view put forward by Karl Popper and the Vienna circle which views science as a singular entity and all scientific work as a part of a singular uniform structure in which all scientists share certain traits in their method. I think these two commentaries are not incommensurable, but rather that one lemma must exist as a subset of another in order to form a more vivid understanding of the nature of scientific research and the underlying social structures that govern it. My intent in writing this paper is to explore a possible means of allying the two theories, the implications that doing so would cause and why Kuhn's avoidance of using his own ideas reflexively has made this necessary.
Scientific positivism suggests that through axioms, work in science can be verified and cross connected toward a better understanding or perhaps a total understanding of the universe. This view is steeped in scientific realism which lends to the casual listener a mythos of absolutely knowledge being something attainable. However science is self reflexive and as such must be subjected to the study of itself. The work of Karl Gödel on incompleteness when combined with Karl Popper's work on positivism implies that science will take on a stronger and stronger self reflexive stance, never reaching a fully developed or mature stage at which further inquiry will no longer be welcome or useful. Here Kuhn's work on paradigm comes into its own, describing the process by which science may continually rebuild and improve upon itself. This of course means that there is no end stage to science as a process (GEB 1979).
Popper forms a distinction between the scientist, the research and the meme rich context which they use to communicate their ideas. The idea here is that there is room between the scientist's interpretation of the research and the paradigm. Kuhn agrees so far. The splitting point is that while Popper thinks that scientist's act as individual revolutionary units, each capable of enacting change on a paradigm gradually through their work, Kuhn suggests that there are some unhappy few that are indoctrinated into a certain discipline and will alter their perspective to protect their interests (Diez 2007). However unfavorable a view Kuhn puts forward, that alone is not reason enough to dismiss it. Instead the work itself must be addressed; if the research points one way and the scientist publishes contrary conclusions to the research they will be shown to be wrong, either in the short term or the long term. On a long enough time line all invalid conclusions from valid results will be discovered and refuted.
Kuhnian normal science seems separate from the people that practice it, both on a psychological level and a sociological level. It appears although Kuhn concerned himself strongly with the act of problem solving rather than its applications. The same is true not only of the science Kuhn describes, but of Kuhn's own work. This internal consistency seems to have surprised Kuhn; as when his work caused what he would call a revolution, he found himself as a primary commentator on an event he seemingly had caused. The issue here is of his idea of an incommensurable paradigm, which is solved by suggesting that the new paradigm does not exist as a separate entity to the old one but rather builds on its foundations (Diez 2007). Revolutions are areas in which an idea is examined and reapplied, as such the same language used in the old paradigm now takes on an entirely different meaning (Demir 1995). As such scientific work may easily be applied cross paradigm, but its meaning may be altered entirely and may no longer be valid within the new. Here was the issue of commensurability; how could it be possible that the same piece of work was both valid in one paradigm and invalid in another?
Work is validated by ones peers using the language of a paradigm to describe ideas and later refine them into axioms. There is nothing about a paradigm shift that will certainly invalidate an axiom unless the ideas within are directly challenged or redefined by the new paradigm. This means that language and ideas of axioms that will remain valid in a new paradigm must be maintained and updated to fit the new paradigm during the revolution stage. By following this ideal researchers will choose the paradigm that suits their work rather than the work that suits their paradigm. This will ensure that shifts in paradigm and progress in science are based on evidence rather than reactionary, and restricted only by scientific skepticism instead of personal interest.
I am reminded, when reading of Kuhn's endeavors into understanding Aristotelian physics in its own paradigm, of Diogenes the Cynic. The story goes that Diogenes used to walk the streets carrying a lit lantern in search of an honest man. Such a search, as with Kuhn's was fruitless but served a purpose; to illustrate its own lack of merit. I however am not the cynic and believe that both Diogenes and Kuhn actually sought what they claimed to; though their methodology reduced their chances for success their searching proves their motive. Since Kuhn was looking for commensurability between ancient and modern paradigms he found it, though he did not know how to see it due to the paradigm he had decided to work under. This reinforces the point that the evidence must determine the paradigm rather than vice versa.
Kuhnian normal science and revolutionary science must therefore be both the identical and different simultaneously. Furthermore this means that incommensurability between paradigms must solely be determined by the evidence; semantic value of a study has no merit in and of itself. From this we see the idea of a normal scientist as a creature in an eigenstate; both supporting a paradigm and undermining it using the same research. The use of a paradigm however slots perfectly into Popper's ideas of science, but the paradigm in this context must now apply not to all scientists or even all scientists in a certain field, rather the smallest possible unit of research; the scientist.
Bibliography:
Callinicos, Alex. Postmodernism as Normal Science. The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Dec. 1995) 734-739
Demir, Ipek. Incommensurabilities in the work of Thomas Kuhn. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol 39. (2008) 133–142
Diez, Jose. Falsificationism and the structure of theories: the Popper–Kuhn controversy about the rationality of normal science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 38 (2007) 543–554
Hofstadter, Douglas R. (1979). Gödel, Escher, Bach. Basic Books ISBN 0465026567.
Sismondo, Sergio. (2004). An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies. Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 9780631234449
This is a wall of text.
It has a note on it reading: 'no unjustified belief allowed'
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